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Introduction
A major research effort was made during this reporting period on analysis of fault-tolerance and security in non-von Neumann machines, including defining fault-tolerance and security, and surveying the trade-offs between security and performance, fault-tolerance and performance, and security and fault-tolerance.
Fundamental issues regarding fault-tolerance and security are brought up, and during the survey, various proposed formal models are studied. and important issues on practicality and trade-offs are examined. While the discussions on trade-offs are especially topical to non-von Neumann machines, they are also pertinent for von Neumann machines.
Definition of fault tolerance:
In this section. we first define and clarify the terms we will use in this report.
Definition of fault tolerance : Fault tolerance is defined as ability of a system to continue correct operation in the presence of fault.
Fault tolerant computing can be achieved by protective redundancy. Typical redundancy techniques are:
(1) Hardware redundancy by additional circuit (2) Software redundancy by additional programs (3) Information redundancy by additional data (4) Temporal redundancy by repetition of operations For practical purposes, additional constraints are introduced; for instance, the amount of extra execution time must be kept within reasonable bounds in real time fault tolerant systems. The redundant hardware and software introduced in the fault tolerant system must be kept at a minimum so that the total storage capacity and resources required must be within feasible limits. Even though we defined the term fault tolerance above, the term is used to represent different things for different systems, and by different people.
To clarify the definition of fault tolerance and to compare or measure degree of fault tolerance, we need a clear spectrum of metrics. Some of the metrics are as -2-follows.
In the total system level, the following metrics can be defined.
(1) Reliability: It is defined as the probability that a system will operate correctly for a specified period of time, or in terms of the expected time between failures.
(2) Availability: The probability that a system is operational at any given time.
(3) Safety: The probability that a system does not get into a disastrous state regardless to its mission.
System designers must first clarify the goal of a system. Highly reliable systems require most stringent requirements: one example of these systems is embedded computer for defense system. Highly available systems, on the other hand, need less stringent requirements, and they permit short period of down-time and short period of failure should not develop into disastrous results. Highly safe systems are primarily concerned with the safety of people involved: one example of this system is a nuclear plant control computer.
Highly available systems usually does not cause safety problem, though crash of the system may cause some inconvenience to people: yet in designing a computer for nuclear plant control, the first priority is given to safety rather than reliabilitv.
When we design fault tolerant, secure, and high performance Non-Von Neumann. we encounter numerous problems, and obviously there are trade-offs between them. At the processor level, we are generally interested in the reliability of systems. When we evaluate the machine, the following are fundamental issues we must consider.
-Architectures: Obviously the architecture will affect fault tolerance. Popular non-Von Neumann architectures are SIMD (single-instruction, multiple-datastream) computers. MIND (multiple-instruction. multiple-data-stream) computers, and systolic arrays, and wavefront arrays.
The number of processors:
The processors can be devoted either for high throughput or redundancy. If all of the processors available are devoted to pure computation, the system does not have redundancy or fault tolerance in the -3-processor level; and hence there is a tradeoff between performance and fault tolerance.
Autonomy of processors:
Each processor must be autonomous for maximum fault tolerance. There cannot be a critical processor whose malfunction could result in system crash.
Communication mechanism: Communication between two processors can be done by shared memory or message transmission or hybrid.
Topologyof There cannot be a connection between each processor for practical reasons: topology decides diameter (maximum interprocessor distance) and number of comriunication paths between two processor and affect performance and the fault tolerance of communication. Routing control is also closely related with performance and fault tolerance.
Reconfiguration: Reshaping of processors must be possible if there are faulty processors.
Extensibility: Eventually when the system expands and needs more processing power: we might ask is it easy to add these processors while still preserving the required fault tolerance. and do we have to design another system from scratch?
Definition of Security
The definition of security may be different for different applications. We will define security with military application in mind.
Definition of Security: Computer security is defined as ability of a system
(1) to protect information from the unauthorized or accidental access (read, write, or modify) , (2) To make more precise definition of protection mechanisms possible. we first set up some risks to computer systems. Extensibility: When we put more processors in the system, is it easy to adapt to new environment while still preserving the previous security or do we have to design the system from scratch and verify the whole system again?
Granularity: How coarse should be the security? Granularity will affect the security mechanism and performance. erification: Verification of security is difficult even on a Von Neumann machine.
If the design is not, well-structured, then it is much more difficult to verify security. especially on Non-Von Neumann machine where many processors are working possibly asynchronously on many processes. Simplified designs make verification easy. but it ma cause performance degradation by not fully utilizing the total processing power.
Theetfect Without fault tolerance. security can not be guaranteed. \Ve can say fault tolerance is precondition of computer security.
Tradeoffs between Security and Performance
Introduction
Efforts to build a high performance secure systems have not been successful ,o far even though securitv is very important for many military applications. In this section, we will point out some of the research is,;ues thqt :.risp in tradeoffs between security and performance. We first claim that a completely secure high performance system is not feasible with current technology. We believe that the first important step in studying the tradeoff between performance and security is the development of formal models of security that incorporate performance considerations. These models should have the analysis capabilities for the following tradeoffs:
(1) Encryption overhead vs Security
Encryption is used frequently to provide security against wire tapping in computer networks or illegal file access in operating systems. Theoretically, the security of the information increases with the size of the key (one time pad being 100( " , secure). In practice, it is no!. feasible to have a very long key. Also. the requirements of a particular message may not even require such tight security.
Therefore, the formal niodel should have concepts which take the tradeoffs into consideration.
(2) Validation Overhea(d vs Sectirity
Researchers have the in past experimented with the idea of a security kernel in a operating system. The main idea behind security kernel is that a small sub-.-vt em (ould validate all accesses to secure objects in the svstem. However, the results seem to indicate that a high performance security kernel is still not feasible. This again brings out the importance of judging the need for validation.
(3) (;ranularity of Security vs Performance
The fine granularity of security provides a more flexible control of the information insemination. For example, iin a multilevel secure object the security classification of different. parts may be different. Again, the performance considerations make it desirable to have a coarse granularity of security objects.
which goes against flexibility of the control.
Our approach to incorporate performance in the security models is to associate timing information with states and state transitions: and using timed Petri -7-nets. In modeling and simulation for computer systems, existing techniques of queuing theory and graph theory are thus far inadequate, both in terms of their representation :,,iity and their computational tractability. However, it is general consensus that Petri Nets and similar formalisms offer some promise in the modeling of asynchronous, concurrent execution of cooperating processes. The next section describes timed Petri nets. The section following that discusses how they can be used as formal security models and how timing information can be used for the security-performance tradeoll.
As distributed computer systems have become more widely used, interest has increased in techniques and tools which can be used to evaluate their correctness and their performance. In this proposal, we will study techniques for the prediction and verification of security and performance of concurrent systems using Timed Petri Nets.
Timed Petri Net
Petri nets are abstract and formal graph models for representing the flow of information and control in systems. especially those which exhibit nondeterministic. asynchronous and concurrent properties. Their properties are quite natural and easy to understand, evt their capability of modeling and analyzing such svstems are very ),werful.
A Petri net is a directed bipartite graph consisting of two types of nodes:
places :ind transitionts. In using graphical representation. they are usually indicated as circles and bars. respectively. Places represent conditions. and tra nsi- If more than one transition is enabled, any one of them may fire, and the choice of which transition to execute is nondeterministic. In the ordinary Petri Net models. the iring of transitions is assumed to be instantaneous.
However. in order to evaluate system performance and to model timing analysis is based on constructing the un-timed reachability graph and is therefore difficult to use when the graph is large or infinite. In the case of infinite graphs (such as those resulting from models of time-outs), the Petri Net model must be artificially altered to guarantee that the reachability graph is finite.
Our approach
The Timed Petri net which we propose includes a set of enabling durations(E), a set of firing durations(D), a set of firing frequencies(F), and a set of named resources(R). Each het is associated with the transitions in the net. The model is thus formally defined as follows: The TPN model is a Petri net model which has been augmented to include a set of firing durations(D), a set of firing frequencies (F), and a set of named resources(R). Each set is associated with the transitions in the net. The model is formally defined as follows: Resource utilization is the fraction of total time during which a resource is used. It is an one of the important criterion when we compare the performance of concurrent systems.
Discussion
The Petri Net, which is a transition oriented model, is able to effectively In spite of the strength of the Petri Net in representing the control flow, the state explosion problem makes it inadequate for modeling the data transfer aspect of protocols. For instance, it would be difficult to model timers or sequence numbers of messages in communication protocols by employing pure transition oriented models, as a number of states are needed to represent each individual sequence number; for protocols with a large number of sequence number spaces, the problem would be even more serious.
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Tradeoffs between Fault-Tolerance and Performance
In the past. fault-tolerance [ANDE 81] and performance [FERR 78] in computing systems have been considered separately by most people. But it can be easily understood that there is an interdependency between the two disciplines.
Techniques that increase fault-tolerance of the system put an additional workload on the system, which generally results in decreased performance during fault-free operation. Moreover when failures are detected. they initiate countermeasures which increase the load on the system through diagnosis, organizing reconfiguration. and rerun time.
Studies have shown that Cray-1 crashes twice as often as the CMUA. which is an ECL FDP-10 used in the computer science department at Carnegie-Mellon University. But it is also known that Cray-I can operate continuously at rates above 138 Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS), while the CMUA operates at 1.2 MIPS. Hence Cray-I executes more than 50 times as many as instructions CAMUA between crashes. Inconsistencies like this one is another reason why fault-tolerance modeling and measuring should be closely related with the characterization of the performance of the system under study.
All the existing techniques for achieving the required degree of fault-tolerance are based upon some form of replication. Conceptually, a function from a computer system can be thought of as an execution of some required operations on some data. Therefore to achieve fault-tolerance of a computer system, we need a replication of both execution and data, and this brings out the following trade-off issues to us:
(1) Replication of execution vs Performance: Multiplicity of processors in a parallel machine or a distributed system makes possible the replication of ,. xecution as a form of the replication of a process. Many identical processes can be created and can execute in a coordinated way to finish a single task reliably. But as more processes are created for a single task, more computing power is consumed. and this decreases the system performance accordingly.
A-nd algorithms to synchronize the processes detect the failing processes, and reconfigure the surviving processes impose additional adversary effect on performance.
(2) Replication of data vs Performance: Storing the identical data on many storage devices increases the availability of the data. As more copies are made, higher availability is achieved. But the management of these multiple copies of data requires algorithms to maintain consistency among the copies in the environment of concurrent updates by many users and network partitions. And these algorithms have more negative impact on the system performance as more copies are made.
While we design and implement an efficient fault-tolerant mechanism with the above trade-off issues in mind, we need a method to describe a proposed mechanism concisely and to check whether this mechanism provides an appropriate level of fault-tolerance and performance. It is well known that formal modeling is a successful technique for these purposes. Although many research efforts have been made in the modeling of fault-tolerance and performance of a computer system, only few of them were intended to model both fault-tolerance and performance.
A first approach to integrated fault-tolerance and performance models is described in [CAST 801 . Realizing that the utilization of a resource exhibits a periodic characteristic and the failure rate of a resource depends on the utilization of that resource, the utilization is modeled by an equation u(t)= mit) + ztt) where mit) is a periodic, deterministic function of time and z(t) is a stationary, zero mean. Gaussian process, independent of m(t), and the failure rate is modeled by was introduced and the issue of how the workload of a system which was characterized by the utilization of each system component affects the failure rate of the system components was addressed. And using the same model the failure effect on workload was explained.
There are some studies (BEAU 78. GAY 79, IHUSL 81 . We believe that study in this unified reliability modeling will be helpful in the quest of more general faulttolerance/performance modeling.
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Although modeling is a technique with which we can represent a complex system in a very concise way, in many cases it tends to oversimplify the system under investigation, and many minor details are lost because its expressive power is limited: and we also have to consider the computational tractability of tile resulting model. Therefore we need to check the validity of the simplified model and also need to improve its expressive power without increasing too much computational complexity. A technique which satisfies these two requirements is simulation. A model can be validated by comparing its result with that of the simulation. And the combination of modeling and simulation can represent the system more correctly, with reasonable computational requirements. by capturing the backbone of the system in the model, representing minor details ika the simulation, and coupling these two in a hierarchical fashion. Therefore we believe that both modeling and simulation technique should be utilized in the research of tradeoffs between fault-tolerance and performance.
Tradeoffs between Security and Fault Tolerance
Many computer applications, e.g. databases for commercial or strategic information. control program for factory control or battle management, need high reliability, fault-tolerance and security. At the same time the mechanisms to provide either security or fault-tolerance tend be quite expensive in terms of overhead.
The security and fault-tolerance problems have many characteristics in common [RAND 86] . [fence it, is very desirable (i) to identify common subproblems between fault tolerance and security, (ii) to have common mechanism to support both security and fault-tolerance, reducing total overhead, and (iii) to study the trade-offs between the degree of fault tolerance and the degree of security, for given constraints of overhead.
As suggested by [LAPR 85], we can view security and fault-tolerance as two different aspects of a common problem. Some of the security problems can be viewed as design errors or a failure of the system. For example, denial of service on a radio channel by jamming is a breach of security: and at the same time it is a system failure, namely lack of communication. We can think of this situation as an unanticipated error in the design, since by choosing random frequencies for the channel, this problem can be almost eliminated.
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We may treat many of security problems and faults as unanticipated failures, which can be reduced by following methodologies like dual design [RAMLA 811.
During the design phase also. there are some mechanisms to be used for achieving both fault tolerance and security. For example a secure system might be designed using internal security checks, for example based on access matrix, which will contain some security violations, just as for fault tolerance. the recovery block Scheme uses acceptance tests. Another example may be the following-in a distributed system we may encrypt a message after partitioning it into n parts. such that the receiver needs exactly rm (m < n) parts to decode the message. We try to send the parts of one message via different paths to the destination. This mechanism protects us against the loss of packets and transmission error, at the same time it provides security against wire tapping.
There are some differences in security and fault-tolerance. The mechanism to achieve one might make it more difficult to ensure the other. For example, one maintins multiple copies of datafiles on network to improve fault-tolerance, yet this leads to poor security, as we have to guard more locations to ensure the security of the datatile. WVhile designing the system, we can have some trade-off between the degree of security and fault tolerance. For example the computational overhead constraint might force to give more computation cycles to fault tolerance compared to security. We realize, finally, that, the similarities and the differences between security and fault tolerance makes this problem unique, significant, as well as topical in the specialized computer system and network today.
